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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

BRIAN DALE LARSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080519-CA

;

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a Restitution Order following a judgment of conviction for
one count of Joyriding with Intent to Temporarily Deprive the Owner Thereof, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005); and one count of
Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding. Jurisdiction is
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(c) (effective
February 7, 2008). Sec Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the
damage done to the vehicle during the initial theft when Larsen was not charged with or
convicted of theft, did not admit responsibility for the vehicle damage, and did not agree

to pay restitution for the vehicle damage as part of his guilty plea. Alternatively, whether
the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to pay restitution in excess of the $500 ceiling set
by Larsen"s guilty plea to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor.
Standard of Review: u'\ Appellate courts] will not disturb a trial court's order of
restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion." Furthermore, c[w|hethcr a restitution (award) is proper . . . depends solely
upon interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute
presents a question of law, which [this Court) review) s| for correctness/" State v. Miller,
2007 UT App 332, €,|6, 170 P.3d 1141 (internal citations omitted).
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 89-92 (Objection to State's Motion for
Restitution and Request for Hearing); and R. 122 (Restitution Hearing).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are determinative of the issue on appeal. Their text is provided in
full at Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005) - Joyriding;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2008)

Sentencing Definitions;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003) - Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 2007)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (Supp. 2008)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003)

Theft by Receiving Stolen Property;
Restitution Definitions;

Prosecution Duties for Restitution;

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2008) - Restitution Criteria.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Larscn was charged by information with one count each of Theft by Receiving
Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408
(Supp. 2007); Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003); and Failure to Stop for a Red Light, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-305 (2005). R. 1-3.
On July 16, 2007, Larscn pleaded guilty to one count of Joyriding with Intent to
Temporarily Deprive the Owner Thereof, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005); and one count of Unlawful Possession of Burglary
'Fools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003). R. 2526; 27-33; 130:2, 5-6; s^e Addenda C and D. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss
Count III. R. 26; 30; 130:2. The trial court ordered a presentence report (PSR). R. 25;
130:5-6.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on February 4, 2008. R. 77-78: 130:8;
see Addendum K. It sentenced Larscn to serve 365 days in jail for the class A
misdemeanor and 180 days in jail for the class B misdemeanor. R. 77; 130:10. It ran the
jail terms concurrently, but consecutively with case no. 071905122 (case no. 5122). R.
77; 130:10-11. It then suspended the jail terms and placed Larscn on probation for 36
months. R. 77; 130:10. The trial court also left "the restitution on this case open for 45
days." R. 77; 130:10.
On March 14, 2008, the State filed a Motion for Restitution, asking for "restitution
in the amount of $4,754.50 to be paid to the viclim(s).'* R. 79. The trial court granted the
3

State's motion. R. 81. Thereafter, Larscn objeeted to the State's motion and requested a
hearing. R. 89-92. The trial court set aside its restitution order and scheduled a
restitution hearing. R. 102-03; 106.
On May 15, 2008, the trial court held a restitution hearing. R. 109; 122; see
Addendum 1\ Following argument, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of
$3,554.50. R. 122:6-7. On June 10, 2008, Larsen filed a timely notice of appeal from the
trial court's restitution order. R. 112.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On April 30, 2007, THG Auto Brokers reported that a 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee
was stolen from its car lot. R. 2. On May 6? 2007, an officer initiated a traffic stop after
he observed Larsen drive through a red light. R. 72:3. Larscn was driving the stolen
vehicle. R. 72:3. When the officer asked Larsen about the vehicle, Larscn said it
"belonged to his friend and he had borrowed it that night.'' R. 72:3. lie also denied
knowing that "the vehicle was stolen." R. 72:3. In a subsequent search of the vehicle,
officers discovered "the ignition switch had been removed." "the steering column was
damaged." and "sound speakers . . . had been removed from their proper locations." R.
72:3. They also "found screwdrivers, wrenches, a hammer, and a pry bar apparently used
to dismantle parts of the vehicle." R. 72:3.
In his guilty plea, Larsen admitted the following elements: "Unauthorized control
over the motor vehicle of another with the intent to temporarily deprive. Possession of
The facts are taken from the Information, the guilty pica affidavit, the change of plea
hearing, the Victim Impact Statement, and the PSR.
4

tools under circumstances manifesting an intent to use in the commission of a theft." R.
28. The factual basis was that "on May 6 l \ 2007 in Salt Lake County," he "exercised
unlawful control over a vehicle belonging to TUG Auto Brokers with the intent to
temporarily deprive. At that time he was in possession of tools that under the
circumstances manifested intent to use to commit a theft." R. 28; 130:4.
The PSR recommended that Larsen be placed on "formal probation to Adult
Probation and Parole." R. 72:1. One of the "special conditions" of probation it
recommended was that Larson "|p|ay restitution in the amount of $4,754.50." R. 72:1.
Likewise, the State filed a Motion for Restitution, asking for "restitution in the amount of
$4,754.50 to be paid to the victim(s)." R. 79. The proposed restitution sum came from
the total damage reported by THG Auto Brokers. R. 83-88. TUG Auto Brokers itemized
the damage as follows:
Vehicle Damage:

Impound/Towing
Mechanical
Repairs/Labor
Parts (Hinckley Dodge)
Detail

$282.00
$1,412.50
$1,765.00
$95~00
TOTAL: $3,554.50

Property Damage:
Fence/Gate

$1,200.00
TOTAL: $1,200.00

R. 72:6; 83; sec Addendum G.
The trial court initially granted the State's motion. R. 81. But it later set aside its

restitution order and scheduled a restitution hearing after Larsen objected to the
restitution order and requested a hearing. R. 89-92: 102-03; 106.
Tn his motion and at the restitution hearing, Larsen stipulated to $282.00 in
restitution. R. 122:8. lie argued, however, that restitution in excess of that amount was
inappropriate. R. 122:3-4. First, the damage to the vehicle was "clearly . . . caused by
the break in" that occurred w\six or seven" days prior to Larsen being found in possession
of the vehicle. R. 90; 122:3. Larsen, however, was not charged with or convicted of
stealing the vehicle. R. 122:3. Rather, he was charged with Theft by Receiving and
entered a guilty plea to Joyriding. R. 122:3. Thus, absent an "agreement as to
restitution/* Larsen should only be ordered to pay restitution for "damage caused by the
defendant once he received the vehicle." R. 122:3. Second, Larsen argued that
restitution should not exceed $500. R. 122:3-4. Larsen pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a
class A misdemeanor, which is defined as joyriding that results in less than $500 damage
to the vehicle. R. 90; 122:3, Thus, because "there was no specific plea bargain regarding
restitution." LarsciTs restitution should not exceed $500. R. 90; 122:3. Finally, Larsen
argued that he should not be ordered to pay restitution for "damage to the gate and
surrounding area where the vehicle was stolen from," especially where "this is the third
time that there's been a break in there." R. 122:4. "That would be appropriate for a
charge of burglary of a building or theft of a car from a building or criminal mischief.
But again, there's no evidence that he [wasj anywhere near that building ever in his life."
R. 122:4.
In response, the State conceded that damage to the gate and fence was not
6

"appropriate [restitutionj for this defendant because . . . we don't have evidence that he is
actually the one who stole the vehicle." R. 122:4. It argued, however, that the trial court
"must assume that the damage that was done to the vehicle was done while the defendant
was in possession of that vehicle." R. 122:5. "The only evidence is that he was the one
in possession of this vehicle. And as such then I think he is responsible for any damage
that was done to the vehicle from the time it was stolen until the time it was recovered."
R. 122:5. It also cirgued that restitution could exceed $500 because "any time that there is
a plea down on anything it's implicit that restitution is going to be part of that plea." R.
122:5. Thus, the State asked for "the damages of $3,554.50." R. 122:6. That number
includes "the towing, the repairs . . . and labor and parts and detail" for the vehicle, but it
"does not include the damage to the fence." R. 122:6.
Agreeing with the State, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of
$3,554.50. R. 122:6-7. This sum included the total damage to the vehicle, but excluded
the damage to the fence and gate. R. 72:6; 83; 122:6, The trial court stated that it did not
"care" that Larsen pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor, which contains provisions
limiting the damage to $500 and the possession to 24 hours. It found that these
provisions did not "prevent" it from ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the total
damage done to the vehicle. R. 122:7-8.
The trial court then considered restitution in case no. 5122, where Larsen pleaded
guilty to Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third felony. R. 122:8-9; sec R. 72:5;
74:1. In that case, the PSR stated that Larsen was stopped on June 25, 2007. R. 74:3.
Similar to this case, he was driving a vehicle that was reported stolen on June 22, 2007.
7

Regarding case no. 5122, the trial court declined to order restitution because "based upon
the charge that he admitted to[,| there's no evidence that he did any damage, that he was
just operating the vehicle, he knew it was stolen when he was caught, I guess basically."
R. 122:9. Larsen asked for clarification on the trial court's ruling: a I think the State has
the same confusion I have, judge. How do we get restitution on the first case then?" R,
122:9. The trial court responded, "Well, I think the joyridc there's no evidence that he
didn't steal the car. It's not a theft by receiving. He admitted he was in possession of it."
R. 122:9. When the trial court asked whether its reasoning was clear, the State said,
"Well, you made it clear, I'm just not sure I agree with you on that reasoning. 1 just don't
see that, 1 mean, 1 guess I don't see the difference." R. 122:9. In conclusion, the trial
court said. "I feel more comfortable with the joyridc than I do by the theft by receiving so
Til deny it. They can sue him civilly." R. 122:9.
Thereafter, Larsen filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's restitution
order. R. 112.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the restitution order because the trial court erred by
ordering Larsen to pay full restitution for the vehicle damage. A defendant cannot be
ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution. In this case, Larson
should not be held to answer for the vehicle damage because he pleaded guilty to
joyriding, not the theft that caused the damage: the evidence did not firmly establish that
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he admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage; and he did not agree to pay restitution
for the vehicle damage as part of his plea agreement. Alternatively, Larsen should not be
held to answer for more than $500 in restitution because, if he admitted responsibility for
the vehicle damage at all, he did not admit responsibility for more that the $500 ceiling
set by the statute he pleaded guilty to

Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor.
ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE RESTITUTION ORDER
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING LARSEN TO
PAY FULL RESTITUTION FOR THE VEHICLE DAMAGE
This Court should reverse the trial court's order that Larsen pay $3,554.50 in
restitution. The trial court's restitution order encompassed the total damages to the
vehicle, including mechanical repairs, labor, parts, and detailing. These damages,
however, were caused by the original theft of the vehicle. Because Larsen was not
charged with or convicted of theft, the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to recoup these
damages as part of his restitution. Instead, the trial court should have ordered Larsen to
pay $282, the cost of impounding and towing the vehicle. See supra at Part A.
Alternatively, Larsen pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, and Unlawful
Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor. Because Joyriding, a class A
misdemeanor, is statutorily limited to $500 in damages, the trial court erred by ordering
Larsen to pa) more than $500 in restitution. See supra at Part B.

9

A.

The Trial Court Erred By Ordering Larscn to Pay Restitution For the
Vehicle Damage Caused By the Theft Where Larsen Was Not Convicted of
Theft, Did Not Admit Responsibility for the Damage, and Did Not Agree to
Pay Restitution For the Damage In His Plea Agreement
"At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition," the State

must "'provide to the district court. . . whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the
restitution specified as part of the plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l)
(2003). '1 hereafter, if the defendant has been "convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages," the trial court must "order that the defendant make
restitution to the victims, or for the conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (Supp. 2008);
sec Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Supp. 2008) (same); State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417,
420 (Utah 1987) (holding "upon conviction of a crime which has resulted in pecuniary
damages . . . trial court is statutorily mandated to order the payment of restitution").
As defined by the Utah Code, a victim is a "person who the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c)(i); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Supp. 2008); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-102( 14)(a) (Supp. 2008). The defendant's criminal activities are limited
to the "offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an
admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b); see
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (Supp. 2008) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a302(5)(a) (Supp. 2008) ("For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense," the

10

offense only includes "criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution.").
In other words, "restitution can include payment for crimes not listed in the
information so long as a defendant admits responsibility or agrees to pay restitution."
State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1J9, 60 P.3d 582 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201 (8)(a)). But, " a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities
for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree
to pay restitution.'" State v. I light, 2008 UT App 118,^[3, 182 P.3d 922 (quoting
Bickley, 2002 UT App 342 at 1|9); sec State v. Watson, 1999 U T App 273, p , 987 P.2d
1289 (per curiam) ("A court may order restitution only if the defendant has been
convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and agrees to pay restitution or
admits to the criminal conduct.").
When assessing whether the defendant admitted responsibility, the trial court
should not attempt to "analyze a defendant's state of mind" or "makjc] inferences." State
v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,1[13, 40 P.3d 1143 (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at
*||5). Rather, it should "focus on admissions made to the sentencing court." Mast, 2001
U [ App 402 at 1|13 (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ]\5). "In other words, the
statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much
like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution." Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at ^{13
(quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^[5); see Hight, 2008 UT App 118 at p .
For example, in Mast, this Court held that a defendant who pleaded guilty to
receiving property stolen during a burglary could not be "ordered to pay restitution for all
11

items stolen in the burglary." Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at 1(1. Rather, she could only be
ordered to pay the restitution resulting from her "admitted conduct, specifically receiving
the stolen property enumerated in her pica." kk at ^|19.
In that case, defendant pleaded guilty to possessing property that was stolen during
a burglary. Id. at f ||l. Although defendant was not convicted of burglary and did not
admit responsibility for any of the other items stolen during the burglary, the trial court
ordered her to pay restitution for the total value of property taken during the burglary less
the recovered items. kk at ^}5. On appeal, the State argued that the restitution order was
correct because defendant acknowledged at sentencing "that her explanation of the events
preceding her arrest was not believable.'' kk at ^fl8.

This Court rejected the State's

argument, however, noting: "Although defendant may have failed to be entirely
forthcoming regarding her receipt of the property," the standard set by the restitution
statute "does not allow a court to infer this as participation in the other crime." kk at *|[18
(citation omitted). This Court then determined that defendant could not "be held to
answer for all damages resulting from the burglary" because she "entered a guilty plea
only to the receiving stolen property charge" and the evidence did not "firmly establish! ]"
that she was responsible for the burglary, kk
Likewise, in Watson, this Court held that a defendant who was charged with
homicide, but pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice, could not be ordered to
pay restitution to the "murder victim's family." Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at \2.
"Without making inferences as the trial court did. it cannot be said that | defendant)
admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution." kk at €j[5.
12

In Watson, the defendant "was charged with criminal homicide and attempted
criminal homicide because she allegedly drove codefendants . . . to and from the crime
scene." Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at <p. She "was also charged with obstruction o[
justice for having sold the car used in the crime." Id, "Under a plea bargain, [defendant]
pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice." kk After "examining] and ma[king|
inferences about (defendant's] state of mind," kL at *|[5. the trial court ordered defendant
to pay restitution to the "murder victim's family for counseling." Ich at *]1. This Court
reversed because "there was no firmly established admission of responsibility upon
which to order |defendant] to pay restitution." I d at f||5. Rather, defendant "only
admitted and pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for which there were no
pecuniary damages." I d Thus, "it cannot be said that [defendant] admitted responsibility
for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution" except by "making inferences as the
trial court did." kk~
Contrarily, in I light, this Court determined that where a defendant pleads guilty to
the burglary or theft itself, it is unnecessary that "his responsibility for any particular
missing item] | 'be firmly established . . . before the court can order restitution [for

2

See also Salt Lake City v. Howell, 2007 UT App 148, 2007 WL 1291084, at * 1
(memorandum decision) (reversing order requiring defendant, who pleaded guilty to
attempted theft by receiving stolen property, to pay restitution for "entire value of the
stolen ramp where there was neither a conviction nor an admission to support the
award"); Bickley, 2002 UT App 342 at *||12 (reversing order requiring defendant to pay
restitution for child support arrearages "for dates outside the time period alleged in the
Amended Information" because "'it cannot be said that [Defendant] admitted
responsibility"* for those dates "'[ w|ithoul making inferences as the trial court did'");
State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) (finding restitution order erroneous for
conduct defendant was not convicted of and had not admitted responsibility for).
13

thcm|." Iiight, 2008 IJT App 118 at €,|4 (citation omitted). In Iiight, defendant "admitted
to burglary/* but "he never admitted to stealing a watch, a set of keys, or a silver dollar
collection/* id. "Thus, he argue) d] that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay
restitution for those items/* IdL This Court disagreed, stating that "[o|nce Defendant
pleaded guilty to burglary, the trial court acted within its broad discretion, after reviewing
the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, in ordering restitution for any pecuniary
damages clearly resulting from the burglary/" Id. at *||5 (citation omitted).
As in Mast and Watson, Larscn should not "be held to answer for" the vehicle
damage because he "entered a guilty plea only to''joyriding, not theft; the evidence did
not "'firmly establish! ]" that he admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage; and he did
not agree to pay restitution as part of the plea agreement. Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at *([18;
sec Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 1|3.
The vehicle damage in this case was likely caused by the initial theft. It included
removal of "the ignition switch," removal of the "sound speakers . . . from their proper
locations," and damage to "the steering column." R. 72:3; 83-88. At the restitution
hearing, Larscn argued that the vehicle damage was "clearly . . . caused by the break in."
R. 122:3. flic State did not dispute this argument. R. 122:4-6. It also conceded that it
had no evidence to prove Larscn committed the original theft. R. 122:4. Regardless, it
argued that Larscn. by virtue of being in possession of the vehicle six days after the theft.
was "responsible for any damage that was done to the vehicle from the time it was stolen
until the time it was recovered/* R. 122:5. The trial court accepted this argument. R.
122:6-7. This was an abuse of discretion because the resulting restitution order was
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based on inference rather than on Larscn's guilty pica, firmly established evidence that
Larsen admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage, or an agreement in the plea deal
that Larsen would pay restitution for the vehicle damage. See Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at
II18; Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 1|5.
Larsen was not charged with or convicted of the theft that caused the vehicle
damage. He was stopped in the stolen vehicle six days after the theft occurred. R. 1-3.
lie said that he had borrowed the car from a friend for the night and denied stealing it. R,
72:3. Based on the evidence, the State did not charge Larsen with theft. R. 1-3. Rather,
conceding that it did not have the evidence to prove theft, it charged Larsen with Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property. R. 1-3; 122:4. As stated in Mast, receiving stolen property
does not authorize the trial court to impose restitution for the damages incurred during
original theft or burglary. See Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at ^[18; Howell, 2007 UT App
148 at *1. Thereafter, Larsen pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor. In his
guilty plea, Larsen admitted that he exercised unlawful control over the vehicle for less
than 24 hours. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(3)(a). This means that his admission did
not put him in possession of the vehicle until more than five days after the theft was
committed and the damage likely done. R. 2; 28; 72:3; 122:3; 130:4.
Larsen also did not admit responsibility for the vehicle damage. In his guilty plea,
Larsen admitted these elements: "'Unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of another
with the intent to temporarily deprive. Possession of tools under circumstances
manifesting an intent to use in the commission of a theft." R. 28. lie also admitted these
facts: "On May 6 l \ 2007 in Salt Lake County." he "exercised unlawful control over a
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vehicle belonging to TUG Auto Brokers with the intent to temporarily deprive. At that
time he was in possession of tools that under the circumstances manifested intent to use
to commit a theft." R. 28; 130:4. None of these facts or elements equate to admitting
responsibility for any damage to the vehicle. Sec Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1314. If the
State had wanted Larsen to admit responsibility for the vehicular damage, it should have
charged him with Theft or. at the very least, Joyriding, a third degree felony, which
rccogni/cs as an element that the vehicle was "damaged in any amount to facilitate entry
into it or its operation." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(3)(b)(iii).
Likewise, Larsen did not admit responsibility for the vehicle damage to the
sentencing court. In his statement for the PSR, Larsen admitted meeting a person and
cc

going with him to still things that wher not arcs and having the drive stolen cars for him

and fallow him places with thes cars." R. 72:3. As in Mast, however, this statement does
not "firmly establish! |" that Larsen committed the original theft. Mast, 2001 UT App
402 at f||l 8. Rather, as in Watson, if it broadens Larsen\s admission at all it still requires
impermissible "inferences" to deduce that Larsen admitted responsibility for the vehicle
damage. Watson, 1999 UF App 273 at ^5. Further, at the sentencing hearing, Larsen did
not speak to the trial court or make any admissions at all. R. 130:8-11.
Therefore, because Larsen was not convicted of and did not admit responsibility
for damaging the vehicle, the trial court could only order him to pay restitution for the
damage if he "agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(l)(b), (l)(c)(i). (4)(a): see Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-102(2), (14)(a); 77-38a302( 1). At the time of the plea agreement, however, the State did not fulfill its duty to
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"provide to the district court . . . whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the
restitution specified as part of the plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l)
(2003). Accordingly, the guilty plea affidavit contains no agreement regarding restitution
for the damage to the vehicle. See R. 27-33. Likewise, the change of plea hearing
contains no discussion regarding restitution. See R. 130:2-7.
Recognizing this deficiency, the State admitted at the restitution hearing that "we
don't have evidence that [Larsen| is actually the one who stole the vehicle.," but argued
that the trial court "must assume that the damage that was done to the vehicle was done
while [ Larsen | was in possession of | it |." R. 122:5. Agreeing with the State, the trial
court ordered Larsen to pay restitution for the damage to the vehicle. R. 72:6; 122:6-7.
This ruling constituted an abuse of discretion because it exceeded the trial court's
authority. S^e Miller, 2007 UT App 332 at f||6. When imposing restitution, the trial court
may not "assume" that the defendant committed criminal conduct for which he was not
convicted and did not admit responsibility. R. 122:5-7. To the contrary, the statutory
language says a trial court should only impose restitution for criminal conduct for which
the defendant was not convicted and did not admit responsibility, if the defendant "agreed
to make restitution as pari of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1 )(b),
(l)(c)(i), (4)(a); sec Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-102(2), (14)(a); 77-38a-302(l).
Therefore, because Larsen was not convicted of theft, did not admit responsibility
for damaging the vehicle, and did not agree to pay restitution for the vehicle damage as
part of his plea bargain, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Larsen to pay
restitution for the damage to the vehicle.
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Indeed, this is the conclusion that the trial court correctly reached is case no. 5122.
R. 122:9. fn case no. 5122. similar to this case. Larsen was caught driving a vehicle that
was reported stolen three days before and pleaded guilty to Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property. The trial court declined to impose restitution in case no. 5 122 because, "based
upon the charge that [Larsen | admitted to[,| there's no evidence that he did any damage,
that he was just operating the vehicle, he knew it was stolen when he was caught." R.
122:9. Likewise, in this case, there was "no evidence" that Larsen caused the damage.
R. 122:9. "[II|c was just operating the vehicle." R. 122:9. The trial court reached a
different conclusion, however, because it improperly inferred that Larsen stole the car
because "there's no evidence that he didn't steal the car." R. 122:9; sec Mast, 2001 UT
App 402 at 1|18; Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 1[5.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the vehicle damage. This Court should then
impose a restitution order for $282 (the amount that Larsen concedes he owed to cover
the impounding and towing), and remand "for such further proceedings as may now be
proper." Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at Y||5-6 (holding "there was no firmly established
admission of responsibility upon which to order | defendant | to pay restitution" because
defendant "pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for which there were no
pecuniary damages," and remanding for further proceedings).
R

The Trial Court Erred By Ordering Larsen to Pay Restitution in Excess of
the $500 Ceiling Set By His Guilty Plea to Joyriding, a Class A Misdemeanor.
If this Court disagrees with Larsen"s argument in section A and determines that
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the trial court was authorized to order Larscn to pay restitution for the vehicle damage,
this Court should still reverse because the evidence does not firmly establish that Larscn
admitted damage in excess of $500. As explained above, " c a defendant cannot be
ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution/" I light, 2008 UT
App 118 a t p (citation omitted): see Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^|3; supra at Part A.
The language of the Joyriding statute states that Joyriding is a third degree felony,
rather than a class A misdemeanor, if the 'Vehicle is damaged in an amount of $500 or
more." Utah Code Ann. §41- la-1314(3)(b)(i). Larscn pleaded guilty to the class A
misdemeanor, not the third degree felony. R. 25-26; 27-33; 130:2, 5-6. Therefore, his
conviction did not authorize the trial court to impose restitution in excess of $500. Utah
Code Ann. §41 -1 a-1314(3)(b)(i).
Further, the State did not include in the plea deal a provision saying that Larscn
was admitting responsibility for vehicle damage in excess of $500 despite his guilty plea
to a class A misdemeanor. R. 27-33. Nor did it include in the plea deal a provision
saying that Larscn agreed to pay restitution for the vehicle damage. R. 27-33. Rather, at
the restitution hearing, the State asked the trial court to hold that restitution for the
vehicle damage was "implicit" in the plea agreement. R. 122:5. Absent an agreement as
part of the plea bargain, however, ordering restitution in excess of the $500 ceiling
statutorily attached to Larson's offense was inappropriate. See Mast, 2001 UT App 402
at 1|18: Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at f,|3.
Thus, even if Larscn admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage by pleading
19

guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, the trial court abused its discretion when it
concluded that the provision defining joyriding as a third degree felony if the "vehicle is
damaged in an amount of $500 or more/* did not "prevent" it from ordering Larsen to
pay restitution in excess of $500. R. 122:7-8. Accordingly, this Court should remand for
a new restitution hearing to determine how much restitution, up to the $500 ceiling set by
LarsciVs guilty plea, is owed. Sec Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at ^Jl 9 (remanding for
restitution "hearing to determine what pecuniary damages resulted from defendant's
admitted conduct, specifically receiving the stolen property enumerated in her plea").

CONCLUSION
Larsen respectfully asks this Court to reverse the restitution order, impose a
restitution order for $282, and remand for such further proceedings as may now be
proper. Alternatively, he asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new restitution
icarmg.
SUBMITTED this i _

day of December, 2008.

LORIJ.SEPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005)
§ 41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a person to
exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle that is not his own, without the consent
of the owner or lawful custodian, and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or
lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle to its control by the actor
is not in any case presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent
on a previous occasion to the control of the motor vehicle by the same or a different person.
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if:
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within
24 hours after the exercise of unlawful control; or
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing the offense:
(i) the motor vehicle is damaged in an amount of $500 or more;
(ii) the motor vehicle is used to commit a felony; or
(iii) the motor vehicle is damaged in any amount to facilitate entry into it or its
operation.
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the person, or an agent
of the person, returned the motor vehicle within 24 hours.
(5) A violation of this section is a lesser included offense of theft under Section 76-6-404,
when the theft is of an operable motor vehicle under Subsection 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii).
Laws 1992, c. 1, § 171; Laws 1997. c. 100, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2001, c. 48, $ L
eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 71, § 24, eff. May 2, 2005.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2008)
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil
penalties—Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(c)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" docs not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;

(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
( 0 to death.
(3)(a) This chapter docs not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant
was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
2

(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a
warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i)
shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single
trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Kxtradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by
any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to
the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after
sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement docs not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section
64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 6413c-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13c-102.
(b)(i) I he costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs
3

and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation
for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213,
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter
the reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).

Laws 1973, c. 196. § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § l;Laws 1981, c. 59. § l;Laws 1983,
c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws
1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990. c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992. c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993. c. 17, g 1;
Laws 1994, c. 13. § 19: Laws 1995, c. I l l , § L eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117,
S Leff. May 1, 1995; La\\s 1995. c. 301. g L eff. May 1, 1995; La^s 1995. c. 337. §
l.cff.Ma) 1. 1995; Laws 1995. 1st Sp.Sess.. c. 10. $ 1, eff. April 29, 1996: Laws
1996, c. 40. $ 1. c\T. April 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 79. 3 98. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws
1296. c, 241_,_§_§_2; 3^efLAi2liI29 J 1 9 6 ; Laws 1998. c. 149. § 1. eff. Ma> 4. 1998:
Lay^L999.__c,210, $ 15. eff. Ma> 3. 1999; Laws 2001. c. 209. $ 1. cff.~April 30, 2001:
Laws 200Zjc. 3^_$ 4. eff. May 6. 2002: Laws 2003. c. 280. 3 1, eff. May 5. 2003;
Laws 2006, c. 208, 3 1. eff. May L 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, 3 1. eff. April 30. 2007:
Laws 2007. c. 339. 3 3, ell. April 30. 2007: Laws 2007, c. 353. 3 9, eff. April 30, 2007:
Lav, s 2008, c. 151, 3 L eff. May 5. 2008.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003)
76-6-205. Manufacture or possession of instrument for burglary or theft.
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, tool, device, article, or other
thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of
any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some
person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 2007)

§ 76-6-408. Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing
that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells,
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the
property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense charged;
or
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to require the seller or
person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to
his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or representative of a
pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(c) is presumed
to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or unlawfully
obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the defendant was
a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a

pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property
without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the
defendant to show that the property bought, received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in Section
76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who:
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same property back again to the
pledge or depositor;
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security on the
property and takes or receives the personal property into his possession and who sells the
unredeemed pledges; or
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other personal property.
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the
property.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-408; Laws 1979, c. 71, § 1; Laws 1993. c. 102. § 1: Laws 2004, c.
299, § 16, eff. Jan. 1,2005.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (Supp. 2008)

§77-38a-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty; or
(c) a plea of no contest.
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain
and suffering.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the
defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
agreement.

(9) ''Pica in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where
charges are dismissed without a plea.
(11) "Restitution'' means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further
defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an
offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that
the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a
bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the
public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.

Laws 2001. c. 137. $ 3. ell. April 30. 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278. $ 2. e l l Ma> 5. 2003;
Laws 2005. c. 96. § 3. eff May 2. 2005.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003)
77-38a-202. Restitution determination -Prosecution duties and responsibilities.
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony or
class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or
district attorney shall provide to the district court:
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution;
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of
the plea disposition.
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county attorney,
municipal attorney, or district attorney shall:
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution
amounts; and
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea
disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the
defendant is charged.
(3) If charges arc not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims
from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-202, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 5.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2008)
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14)
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(a) "'Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all
losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of
sentencing or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part,
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) Tf the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution,
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an clement a
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or

destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of
treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in
bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the
victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the
offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution,
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.
(d)(i) lixcept as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time
of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
2

(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.

Laws 2001. c. 137. 3 8. cff. April 30. 2001: Laws 2002. c. 35. 3 13. eff. Ma\ 6. 2002:
Laws 2002. c. 185. $51, cff. May 6, 2002: Laws 2003, c. 285. 3 1, eff. May 5. 2003:
Laws 2005. c. 96. § 5. cff. May 2, 2005.

3
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BRIAN LARSEN,
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Defendant.
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BARRETT

I, BRIAN LARSEN, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory Provision

Degree

A.

JOYRIDING
41-la-1314

MA

B.

Possession of Burglary Tools
76-6-205

MB

Punishment: Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
0-1 YEARS JAIL; $ 2,500 plus
85% fine and surcharges

6 MONTHS JAIL; $1000 + 85%
fine and surcharges

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read
it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to
which I am pleading guilty (or no contest).

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
Unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of another with the intent to temporarily
deprive. Possession of tools under circumstances manifesting an intent to use in the
commission of a theft.
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed
the foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not
dispute or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the
court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
On May 6, 2007 in Salt Lake County. Brian Larsen exercised unauthorized control
over the motor vehicle of THG Auto Brokers with the intent to temporarily deprive.
He also possessed tools that under the circumstances manifested an intent to use to
commit a theft.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following
rights under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand
that if I plead guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and
that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me.
I understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to
pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
I have not waived my right to counsel
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Michael Misner My
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences
of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no
contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to
have a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified

against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the
witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I
were to have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know
that if I chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence
against myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that
they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not
plead guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am
guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need
only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would
have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury
or judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not
afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand
that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I
understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within
30 days after my sentence is entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading
guilty (or no contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting
myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may

include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as
part of a plea agreement.

Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or
they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an
additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or
which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
Plea agreement. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the
result of a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the
promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in
this statement, including those explained below:
Count 1 is amended to a MA joyriding and with a plea to that charge and to
count 2, count 3 is dismissed.

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the
charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the
prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they
express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the
judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no
contest). No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to
me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I

understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to
make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I a m iOyears of age. I have attended school through the / /
grade. I
can read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an
interpreter has been provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants
which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally
capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I
am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from
understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I
understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only
be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be
pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 16

day of

July

, 2007 .

"Cma/ru Tnt/Asm,
DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
certify that I am the attorney for
Brian Larsen
, the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to
him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made byjthe
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true

ATTORNEVFOFTfJI
Bar No. 8742

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
Brian Larsen
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are
fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe
that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve
the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNI
Bar No. ^ s ^ q -

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the
Court witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest)
plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the-defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to
the crime(s) set forth in the Statemen/tbe aqcepjted and entered.
Dated this

A

day of

DISTRICT COURT JUDG^E

?P>

TabD

£ r — t r ^ OtNnvD\^\A
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT
iTr.TAT.DTSTRTCTr.OTn?T

»

w

I

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
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By
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1

SALT LAKE, UTAH - JULY 16, 2 007

2

HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING

3

For the Plaintiff:

CHRISTINA P. ORTEGA

4

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL D. MISNER

P R O C E E D I N G S

5

MR. MISNER: Judge, the matter of Brian Larsen.

6
7

Judge, what we anticipate on Mr. Larsen is that Count I would

8

be amended to Joyriding, it's a Class A Misdemeanor.

9

statute is 41.1(a) 13.14.

The

10

THE COURT: Okay.

11

MR. MISNER: And he'll plead to that and to Count

12

II.

13

THE COURT: The burglary tools?

14

MR. MISNER: Yes.

15

THE COURT: And then the red light would be

16

dismissed?

17

MR. MISNER: Yeah, sure.

18

THE COURT: You've explained to Mr. Larsen his

19

constitutional rights?

20

MR. MISNER: I have.

21

THE COURT: And you're satisfied that the plea will

22

be voluntarily, knowingly and with understanding?

23

MR. MISNER: Yes, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Mr. Larsen, are you satisfied with the

25

advise given you by Mr. Misner?

1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT: How lone[ have you been in jail, sir?

3

THE DEFENDANT: Approximately a month and a half.

4

THE COURT: Month and a half.

You're not under the

5

influence of any unlawful drugs or alcohol at this time are

6

you?

7

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Are you taking any kind of medication?

9

The Defendant: Just, Albuterol inhaler for my

10
11

asthma.
THE COURT: So you're thinking clearly and you

12

understand what you're about to do; is that right?

13

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: And you do understand that you have a

15

right to plead not guilty if you chose?

16

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

17

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Misner was talking about your

18

constitutional rights.

19

need to be satisfied that you understand these rights and

20

understand that by entering a plea to the two charges he has

21

identified, that you are giving these rights up.

22

the right to a speedy trial; the right to an impartial jury.

23

The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses produced by

24

the State and provide a defense; the right against self-

25

incrimination; the right to compel witnesses on your own

I'm going to go over those again. I

They are

behalf at no cost to you, right to proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and if convicted, the right to appeal a
conviction.
You also have the presumption of innocence until
you admit your guilt.
presumption goes away.

Once you admit your guilt, that
Do you have any questions about these

rights, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand each of these rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And you understand that you're giving
them up when you enter your pleas?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Misner, would you give me a factual
basis for the entry of the plea, please?
MR. MISNER: Judge, it was on May 6th, 2007 in Salt
Lake County, Mr. Larsen exercised unlawful control over a
vehicle belonging to THG Auto Brokers with the intent to
temporarily deprive.

At that time he was in possession of

tools that under the circumstances manifested intent to use
to commit a theft.
THE COURT: And are those facts true, Mr. Larsen?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand, sir, you're pleading to
a Class A Misdemeanor and a B, you can be sentenced up to a

4

1

year on the A, 180 days on the B?

The respective fines on an

2

A is $2500 plus an 85 percent surcharge.

3

plus an 85 percent surcharge.

On a B it's $1000

Do you understand that, sir?

4

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT: How do you plead to a Joyride, a Class A

6

Misdemeanor and Possession of Burglary Tools, a Class B

7

Misdemeanor, guilty or not?

8

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

9

THE COURT: Okay. Will you have him sign the

10

statement, please?

11

THE BAILIFF: Are you right handed?

12

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

13

MR. MISNER: And Judge, we would ask the Court to

14

consider a release to pre-trial pending sentencing. Now that

15

he's entered pleas to a couple of misdemeanors, he does have

16

a job available.

17

children, would like to get out and work and help her with

18

them. I believe his family is here in court like they were

19

last time.

20
21

He lives with his girlfriend and her

Seems to have good support.
THE COURT: I don't know who gave me this

psychological assessment, that-

22

MR. MISNER: [Unintelligible].

23

THE COURT: Did you give that to me?

Okay, what I'm

24

going to do is refer him to AP&P for a pre-sentence report

25

and - has he signed that?

Do you want to bring that up to

1

me, Mr. Misner.

2

THE BAILIFF: Will you do that for me. Thank you.

3

MR. MISNER: Thank you.

4

THE COURT: If you'll prepare an order I'll release

5

him to pre-trial.

6

do.

Make sure he understands what he needs to

7

Based upon the representations of Mr. Misner and

8

the statements made to me by Mr. Larsen, I'm going to find

9

that he, and from my personal observations of him, I'm going

10

to find he did voluntarily and knowingly executed this

11

statement and I'm going to approve it at this time, and

12

incorporating the statement by reference of his plea as a

13

conviction.

14

checking in daily or every couple of days. He'll waive the

15

maximum time?

Released to pre-trial. Maybe he ought to be

16

MR. MISNER: He will.

17

THE COURT: How about September 10, 9:00?

18

MR. MISNER: Permission to approach?

19

THE COURT: Any other conditions, obviously.

20

MR. MISNER: I've talked with him about the fact

21

that there are two different people that he has to meet with

22

as soon as he's out, one named AP&P and one named pre-trial,

23

that they are two different entities.

24

THE COURT: And don't foul up, all right?

25

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

1
2

THE COURT: Make sure you get out to AP&P. Make sure
you check in with pre-trial.

3
4
5 I
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. MISNER: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all I
have.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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3

For the Plaintiff:
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4

For the Defendant:

CATHERINE E. LILLY

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

P R O C E E D I N G S
MS. LILLY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Brian Larsen.

I'm standing in for Michael Misner.
THE COURT: Larsen, all right. I have two cases it
looks like.
MS. LILLY: Yes.

Looks like he entered guilty pleas

to a Class A and a Class B.
THE COURT: Case number 3635 is an A and a B. And
then the other case is a 3rd?

14

MS. LILLY: Oh, it's a 3rd, okay.

15

THE COURT: Yes.

16

MS. LILLY:

17

THE COURT: I have an addendum on the 3rd.

18

I only have a pre-sentence report.
Did you

get an opportunity to look at that?

19

MS. LILLY: No, what does it - may I look at it?

20

MR. SHUMAN: Okay, let's see, here it is.

21

THE COURT: They say 90 days jail, fine, fee, DORA

22
23
24
25

substance abuse eval.
MS. LILLY: So it's essentially the same except for
the 90 days?
THE COURT: Now this one says 60 days, fine, fee,

restitutionMS. LILLY: And no contactTHE COURT: No contact.

I don't know, what do you

want - do you want to take a look at this amendment
(inaudible)?
MS. LILLY: Well, it sounds like it's about the same
in terms. And Your Honor, he has spent 90 days in jail.

We

are asking the Court to let that count for the time that he
needs to do and then refer him to AP&P.
THE COURT: So he did 90 days?
MS. LILLY: Uh-huh (affirmative).
THE COURT: No sense in giving him more time then.
MS. LILLY: Right.
THE COURT: Let's sentence him on the felony first,
5122. I'm going to sentence him to an indeterminate term at
the Utah State Prison, 0-5, stay the imposition of that
sentence.

Place him on 36 month probation with Adult

Probation and Parole. I'm going to fine him $250 and assess a
$250 public recoupment fee for services of Ms. Lilly. AP&P
can determine how that should be paid. I also want him to
perform 25 hours of community service within the next six
months, complete a DORA substance abuse evaluation and any
recommended treatment, complete a mental health evaluation
and any recommended treatment.
I don't know if there's any restitution on this

9

1

theft charge so I'll leave that open. No alcohol, no drugs.

2

He will be required to submit his person, place of residence

3

or any property under his control to search and the detection

4

of drugs, no alcohol and submit to drug testing at the

5

request of his probation officer. He's also to obtain a

6

mental health evaluation and engage in any recommended

7

treatment.

8
9

Case number 3635, 180 days and a year on the A and
B.

Consecutive, suspended, 36 months probation with Adult

10

Probation and Parole.

11

restitution?

12

Is there any question about the

MS. LILLY: Your Honor, I don't know.

You know,

13

like I said, this is Mr. Misner's case.

14

give them 45 days for the parties to work it out.

15

I'd only ask that

THE COURT: All right. They do have a number here so

16

I'll leave the restitution on this case open for 45 days and

17

let the State submit to Mr. Misner whatever is required.

18

Okay?

19

MS. LILLY: Thank you.

20

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.

21

MR. SHUMAN: Your Honor, one question. Are these

22

cases running consecutive or concurrent?

23

THE COURT: Consecutive.

24

MR. SHUMAN: Okay, good.

25

THE COURT: The A and the B are concurrent but

10

consecutive to the 3rd. Did I get that right, consecutive to
the other case, the Third Degree Felony. Okay?
MS. LILLY: Are we done?
THE COURT: We're done.
MS. LILLY: Okay, thank you.
COURT CLERK: We have a question (inaudible).

On

the fine and attorney, was there a fine and attorney fee?
THE COURT: Yeah, $250, $250.
COURT CLERK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

11
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BRIAN DALE LARSEN,
Defendant.
RESTITUTION HEARING MAY 15,2008
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT

BLEB HISTKSGT eOtJEl
Third Judicial District

JUL 2 1 2008

ByJll

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
F1LED
1775 East Ellen Way
APPELLATE
COURTS
UTAH
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186
JUL 2 8 2008

3,oQgo3yy<4»

\-o

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 15, 2008

2

HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

For the Plaintiff:

PATRICIA S. CASSELL

4

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL D. MISNER

5
6

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

All right, so this is State of Utah vs.

7

Brian Dale Larsen, case number 071903635, and I've got two

8

cases it looks like, 071905122.

9

enter your appearances please?

10

MS. CASSELL:

11

MR. MISNER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. CASSELL:

14

Do you want to go ahead and

Patricia Cassell for the State.
Michael Misner for Mr. Larsen.
Okay.

Ms. Cassell.

I believe this might - I don't know

that we'll be putting on evidence.

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. CASSELL:

17

MR. MISNER:

What are we going to do then?
Unless Judge, I think on each of the

18

restitution hearings there are legal issues to determine if

19

restitution is appropriate at all.

20

address those arguments first.

So I think we need to

If the Court were to find

21 j that rest itution that' s appropriate, then we neeid maybe some
22

evide nee on what restitution is.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. MISNER:

25

All right.

Go ahead.

Judge, I'll start.

On case ending

5122, the request for restitution is indicati ng th at
1

1

basically the vehicle was worth $5,100.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MISNER:

$4,100.
I think it's $5,100 and it was sold

4

for $1,000, so the difference is $4,100.

5

talks about is from the break in basically damage to the

6

whole steering column, damage to radios and things like that,

7

but Mr. Larsen was charged with theft by receiving a stolen

8

vehicle not theft of a vehicle and not burglary.

9

argument we're making is that you're only entitled to

The damage that it

The legal

10

restitution, even in cases where restitution is a negotiated

11

part of the settlement that when there's a plea down to the

12

actual restitution as a direct result of the crime committed

13

and that's right out of the statute.

14

you to get restitution for damage to the vehicle you have to

15

show the vehicle was in the same condition when this person

16

received the stolen vehicle, not the shape it was in when it

17

was stolen, three, four, five, six, seven days before.

18

in a case where the person who was charged with theft by

19

receiving and actually crashed the vehicle, I think that's

20

appropriate the restitution with damage to vehicle be

21

ordered.

22

vehicle, damage that goes back to the theft of the vehicle is

23

not appropriate.

24

State both ways, you'd give them the opportunity to charge

25

for the crime that's easier to prove, theft by receiving, and

Theft by receiving for

Now

In a case where you're just caught with the

And I think if it were you'd be given the

1

then you give them restitution for the crime they chose not

2

to charge which is theft, the harder to charge crime, I'm

3

thinking the theft by receiving case the damage has to be for

4

damage caused by the defendant once he received the vehicle.

5

So if we had some testimony that he had it on this day and it

6

was fine and then he had it on this day and it wasn't, that

7

would be appropriate.

8
9

In a case where clearly damage is caused by the
break in, unless he's charged with stealing the vehicle it's

10

not appropriate.

11

guess we could hold on to until later.

12

And anything else above the [inaudible] I

On the second case, it's a similar argument and I

13

won't repeat it or that portion of it, but it's slightly

14

different in that in that case the plea was to joy reading, a

15

Class A misdemeanor, as opposed to attempted theft by

16

receiving.

17

think to the vehicle, damage to the property where the

18

vehicle was stolen, and things like that.

19

don't believe there was any agreement as to restitution.

20

I think that restitution is only appropriate for the charge

21

that he was convicted of which is joy riding.

22

Class A misdemeanor, specifically has in its statute that

23

there was no damage over $500.

24

$500, you cannot plead guilty to [inaudible] as a Class A

25

misdemeanor.

In this case again, it's talking about damage, I

In this case I
So

Joy riding, a

If there was damage done over

That becomes a third degree felony.

So that

1

would limit restitution right there to $500.

2

back on that same argument I just made which I won't repeat

3

and it's just not appropriate for a theft by receiving case.

4

Then you fall

In addition in that case, there's a request for

5

restitution and damage to the gate and surrounding area where

6

the vehicle was stolen from and an indication that this is

7

the third time that there's been a break in there and the

8

damage has been done to this same gate.

9

appropriate for a charge of burglary of a building or theft

That would be

10

of a car from a building or criminal mischief.

11

there's no evidence that he anywhere near that building ever

12

in his life.

13

vehicle where the vehicle was stolen from when we're talking

14

about a vehicle that was found in his possession a week later

15

just isn't appropriate for the charge of theft of receiving

16

stolen property and certainly not for the conviction of joy

17

riding. Those are the legal arguments.

18

But again,

No charge in that, and so any damage to the

MS. CASSELL:

And, Your Honor, I think that I'll

19

start with the joy riding case, of course I think that we

20

would concede that if there's any damage to a fence that was

21

made on a breaking in and stealing of the vehicle when the

22

vehicle was stolen wouldn't be appropriate for this defendant

23

because there is no evidence that he - you know, we just

24

can't - we don't have evidence that he is actually the one

25

who stole the vehicle.

1

However, Your Honor, any damage that had been done

2

to the vehicle while - I think the Court must assume that the

3

damage that was done to the vehicle was done while the

4

defendant was in possession of that vehicle.

5

possession of the vehicle when he was arrested.

6

assumption is and should be that he was in possession of the

7

vehicle the entire time.

8

anyone else in possession of the vehicle.

9

is that he was the one in possession of this vehicle.

He was in
I think the

There's no evidence that there's
The only evidence
And as

10

such then I think he is responsible for any damage that was

11

done to the vehicle from the time it was stolen until the

12

time it was recovered.

13

that he - I mean we can argue about the amounts.

14
15

THE COURT:

And so I think then it is appropriate

How about the argument relating to the

500 bucks?

16

MS. CASSELL:

1 7 - 1

Well, Your Honor, I guess I would be

would be - I think it's something Mr. Misner and I have

18

to discuss, but I'm not sure that it's correct and there

19

would be no - there was no agreement about restitution.

20

think that any time that there is a plea down on anything

21

it's implicit that restitution is going to be part of that

22

plea.

23

about that, but I think that all - I think it's clear that

24

any time that there is a plea to either joy riding or to

25

possession of stolen property, restitution is part of that

I

And I think that - we would have to have a discussion

1

agreement.

2 J
3

We can discussTHE COURT:

And so with respect to the car, what

were the damages?

4

MS. CASSELL:

The damages to let's, start with

5

3635, Your Honor, we would ask the damages of $3,554.50.

6

That does not include the damage to the fence.

7
8

THE COURT:

Okay.

Run that by me again.

Three

thousand?

9

MS. CASSELL:

$3,554.50.

And that includes what

10

we've included, the towing, the repairs to the - and labor

11

and parts and detail.

12

damage to the vehicle and that's $4,100.

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. CASSELL:

15

The other case would just be the

Uh-huh (affirmative).
We would submit it on that, Your

Honor.

16

MR. MISNER:

17

THE COURT:

Your Honor I'm satisfied on 3635 on the joy ride

18

that the restitution is appropriate for the damage to the

19

car.

20

MR. MISNER:

Judge, I can say that I do have the

21 I State's original email offer to me which doesn't mention
22

restitution we waived at the first roll call based on the

23

email offer.

24
25

THE COURT:

Well, in any event, I'm ordering

restitution in this case.

The other one I don't think

1

there's a limitation.

In fact, what it says is it says

2

''Violation of this section is a third degree felony if (a)"

3

you got that, "(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct

4

of the person committing the offense to the motor vehicle is

5

damaged in the amount of $500 or more."

6

he's going to pay it.

I've got $3,554.50

7

MR. MISNER: So that - but that would -

8

THE COURT: There's no limitation, it's just matter

9

of the damage to the vehicle.

10
11

MR. MISNER:

there was no damage of $500 or more.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MISNER:

14
15
16

Well, it's a Class A misdemeanor if

Well, there was though.
So that makes it a felony.

That means

that THE COURT:

It makes it a third degree felony,

that's right.

17

MR. MISNER:

18

THE COURT:

We plead to an A.
I don't care.

He was charged with a

19

third, he engaged in a joy ride, that isn't limitation.

20

can't tell me that when there's a plea bargain on a joy ride

21

that I can't order restitution because of that provision.

22

That provision doesn't prevent that.

23

about restitution.

24

if you've got $500 in damage.

25

You

It doesn't say anything

It just says it's a third degree felony

MR. MISNER:

Well, I would also -

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. MISNER:

3

And there was a plea bargain here.
It's 24 hours as well and the vehicle

was stolen a week earlier.

4

THE COURT:

I'm just saying you got the benefit of

5

a plea bargain and I'm going to order.

6

you want, I don't care.

7

that that but I can be told otherwise.

8

Now, 5122.

9

MR. MISNER:

You can take it up if

I think that I'm in my rights to do

This was a little more difficult.
Judge, can I, just for the record on

10

that one, I want to make sure that it's clear as we put in

11

our motion that we did stipulate to the $282 on that one you

12

just ordered which was part of that figure -

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MISNER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MISNER:

Which case are you referring to now?
The one we just did.
The joy ride?
Yeah.

Just, if this does get appealed

17

I want there to be no confusion we stipulated to the $282

18

amount.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MISNER:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.
Sorry.
That's okay.

22

Misner, on this other case.

23

restitution.

I agree with you, Mr.

I don't think I can order

So I'm going to decline that.

Obviously, these

24 J people will have an opportunity to sue him civilly if they
25 I chose to.
8

1

Okay.

2

MS. CASSELL:

3

Is there anything else we need to discuss?
Yeah, what's the reason for that just

so that -

4

THE COURT:

I disagree that based upon the charge

5

that he admitted to there's no evidence that he did any

6

damage, that he was just operating the vehicle, he knew it

7

was stolen when he was caught, I guess basically.

8
9
10

MR. MISNER:

I think the State has the same

confusion I have, judge.

How do we get restitution on the

first case then?

11

THE COURT:

Well, I think the joy ride there's no

12

evidence that he didn't steal the car.

13

receiving.

14
15

He admitted he was in possession of it.
MR. MISNER:

He was charged with theft by receiving

stolen property on that case as well.

16
17

It's not a theft by

THE COURT:
differently.

18

Okay.

He pled to a joy ride, so I view that
Am I clear enough or not?

MS. CASSELL:

Ms. Cassell?

Well, you made it clear, I'm just not

19

sure I agree with you on that reasoning.

20

that, I mean, I guess I don't see the difference.

21

that -

22

THE COURT:

I just don't see

Well, I do in that sense.

I think

I feel more

23

comfortable with the joy ride than I do by the theft by

24

receiving so I'll deny it.

25

All right.

They can sue him civilly.

Okay?
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August 30, 2007

To Whom it may Concern,
I just want the court to know my feelings and frustrations about this case and the defendant. I have
had three separate vehicles stolen from our dealership between March and June of 2007, all of which were
damaged in a similar matter. The gate was locked, but was forced open using a chain or something similar
which left the gate and fence damaged. In addition to the damage to the Jeep and the fence, we invested
$5000.00 in some security/surveillance equipment, just for a sense of security.

Attached you'll be able to see the damage that was done to the 98 Jeep, as well as prices/estimates to repair
and get the vehicle and the property damage back to there original condition.

ITEMIZATION OF DAMAGE TO JEEP
Impound/Towing
$282.00
Mechanical Repairs/Labor $1412.50
Parts (Hinkley Dodge)
$1765.00
Detail
$95.00
TOTAL $3554.50

ITEMIZATION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE
Fence/Gate
$1200.00
TOTAL $1200.00

GRAND TOTAL

Thank you for your help in this matter.
Sincerely,

$4754.50

HINCKLEY DODGE. INC.
2309 SOUTH STATE STREET
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-2725

M

IEEEE

CHRYSLER
GENUINE PAR

PARTS DIRECT: (801)487-3625
UTAH WATS: 1(800) 662-4305
OUTSIDE UTAH WATS: 1(800)453-4721
NATIONAL WATS: 1(800) US-MOPAR
FAX: (801)484-6840

"Oldest Dodge Dealership
In the country"

\

SHIPPED TO

| SOLD TO

T H G AUTOBROKER
1 3 1 8 SO 2 0 0 WEST
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UT

84115-0000

801-487-1391
TERMS: Parts relume i for credit musl be accompanied by invoice and subject to 20% restocking charge.
DICSLAIMER OF WARRANTIES: All warranties on the products sold heroby are those made by the manufacturer. The seller, HINCKLEY Dodge, Inc., hereby expressley disclaims! all warranlies, either
expressed or implied, including any implied warranty of merchantability orfitnsssfor e particular purpose, and HINCKLEY Dodge, Inc., neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to agjsume for It any liability
in connection with the sale. A Service Charge of 1-1/2% per month (A.P.R. -18%) will be made on all accounts 30 days past due. Title to the properly herein described, and any additions or substitutions, shall
remain in the seller's name until paid in full and the purhcaser agrees to pa/ all expenses, charges, and costs, including collection costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, in the event it becomes necessary for
seller to place this account for collection. Net, 10 days end of month.
| YOUR PURCHASE ORDER

Verbal
|

TERMS

INVOICE DATE

KEN
1
1
1
1
2
2
1

|

$uote

1

| SALESPERSON NAME

SHIP VIA

I QTY.

INVOICE NUMBER|/ PG.

8/29/07

Payment Due Upon R e c e i p t

5017508AA
5 0 7 2 3 3 7AA.
4864354AB
470.4383AH
56038548AA
56 0 0 7 3 4 9 :
5EY58LAZAB

e x t 1165

BIN

DESCRIPTION

: L I N K : LIFTGA.TE HANDLE 4 3 8 / C 0 3
903/C04
: HANDLE: LIFTGATE
EP
: COLUMN: STEERING
: RADIO: AM/FM WITH CD EP
: SPEAKER: DOOR
EP
EP
SPEAKER: DOOR
: CARPET: CARGO FLOOR EP

LIST

14.00
128.00
975.00
666.00
41.00
32.00
357.00

1
NET

1 AMOUNT

10.50
96.00
731.25
550.00
30.75
24.00
267.75

I

10.50

j

96. oo;

|
!
j
i
j

731.25
550.001
61.50
48.00
267.75

1

: DATE PRINTED |

8/29/07

| TIME |

14:28:21

1765.00

PARTS
FREIGHT

PARTS DEPARTMENT HOURS
8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. M - F

Thank You!
NO RETURN ON ELECTRICAL OR SAFETY ITEMS OR SPECIAL O R D E R S .

X
O Itofl ENSIGN IrtwmBbonSwiMm, Inc • DwdwlNp App0c»Ucn Cfoop (K»>WS.H>24

C.O.D. CHARGE

.00

SALES TAX OR TAX I.D. | D 6 7 4 0 O
SPECIAL ORDER DEPOSIT
TOTAL

|

1765.00

1 J / L l i r i V x y^L-.-

801-333-8588
235 West 500 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
www.diamondrnobile.net
! a Service u Pick-up Phone
L I Install
Q Deliver.......
Name

*

^
:

~7~£//^

801-524-9500
w w w. autos tr adamotors. com
Q Mobile
Date of Order
Q Shop
\

^

-'" . ' •

Address
City
. Year.

PO #
"~

State v

"^~

Make

Model

Co,or

Ser al

' *

"
•

QUAN.

r

StoSk#

1

e-maii

'

^»

PART NO. |

j

DESCRIPT^

1 7)

I

PRICE

I

"

7~T

•1 ;>• ,
I '"••*:'."

|}

/

,.

AMOUNT

/

r

. ^ I . M t ^

"' "" " "^

1

Services Recommended

TOTAL
MATERIAL

i

TECHNICAL
SERVICE TIME

TAXj

^tCUt^

INVOICE

^xcc^
30PY

Technicia n

( DATE

/

"• " \

.,

.,

1

J

/

COMPLETED

/

J Q / ^ Q u
ON COMPLETION (
1
f l
QFWORK - — » - |
TOTAL I
hereby accept above performed $
'£
g n d
s being satisfac tory and
acknowledge that equipment has b e e n
^ndl
jn
d
ion.
,£,r -y
D.amond .s not response for probler^ ^
^
^ ^ ^ h e
steam cleaning is aeriormec

:

— Customer signature j S

;usroMER

INFORM A rjON

i

r WorkNi
I m/Zipcodc

\ \n\x\c MJ

Address

DA I E :
Giber Nr
Tunc Wdnied

f Cell Nr

* / " / •

31

JAR IINFORMATION
NFC
Lie Pl.ue

Mileage

ICLIIIUCI.IIIU 1

Ct^LfU

KJ

VIN

bUr**u

TECH COMMENTS / PART DESC & NR.

THINGS TO CHECK / TASKS TQ DO

a

Engine

Color
Hinc Coinplclcf)

ekj^_

Lt^JBL

g£g-

.£-£££_

COST

TIME

m a
i
CO

a

^^<,l^S$ifr^

-

U5eD

3 SO

a

r>W

a

fctoe^

a
a

77fT8i^ ymZ,

xA

%SD,<K>

L. Of7

*

^e

LU

>
O

r
o

H

a
a
Q

cr

•
a
a
0-

en

a
D
CD
rvj

GC

•
•
a

a
iTILL NEEDS / T H I N G S T O W A T C H F O R :

t/r?,**"
/VXf

JRux*.

DM'« Ant«mo4lv» »«vte«e
4062 South £tat»Sfre«t
.Utah 64107
4
' ^ 1 ) r i 2 09<J5

,£5**"
fftta-

^

^5^755
#

/ 4 / 2** g.O

Po-faa?

(gc^-7

7^7^L m^-7^

Case No.

Q~? ~ f f i A J ^

IMPOUND RELEASE
Salt Lake City P o l i c e Department
The Impound Lot is located at 2150 West 500 South (Take 400 South westbound to 2150 West north side of street)

Fees
TowingFee:'$.

'&(£)b/'

'^

•

fT\ / \

Storage Fee: $•

.'67

^

The storage fee includes the day the vehicle is impouEgjA \T\
the day it is released, weekends and holidays.
FT*

O / 0V

ftg^ftO.*

MAY i >

NO CHECKS ACCEPTED

TOTAL: $"

VEHICLE INFORMATION

Make:' \

W^^
=3

—-M:

Year: 6 f1)

State: _ (A i

• License No:

:

RELEASE INFORMATION
fc^T?

..

^

Release to:
Address: _ J H

i

City
^

Drivers Lie No:
Representing: __

•-r#&

n . I
. State- • ,•
yj/s ' i - / S P'-',/"'A///" h

Released by:

Slate11 "
Type

Zip Code''

Notorized Letter on file
_ ID#:- t y i X -

SLCPD

/

PECK UP FROM IMPOUND LOT
PLEASE READ CAREFULLYI MUST HA WE A VAUD DRiV&VS LICENSE ON
PERS0M
Upon receipt of this "Release Form" and "Paid Receipt", the vehicle listed above MUST BE REMOVED from
the Impound Lot, 2150 West 500 South, prior to 6:00 P.M., this date: K;^" j j~(j
/
Failure to do so will
require you to return to the Police Department/Service Desk, Lobby-Main Floor, to obtain an additional "Paid
Receipt" for extra storage fee(s). Both receipt and this form must be presented at the Impound Lot. The vehicle
will be released at the Impound Lot to a licensed driver only.
Signature of p_erso
Released to
•Servdesk Form la2006

Date J 5 " - V / - < 3 * 7

